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IN 'l'H~ 
Supreme Court of Appeals o Virginia 
AT H,ICHMUND. 
Record No. 2138 
CITY OF LYNCHBURG AND R. W. B. HA.RT. 
CITY MANAGER, . 
versus 
DO¥INI0N THEATRES, INC. 
PETITION. 
To the Honorable Justices of the Supreme o·u.rt of Appeals 
of Virginia: 
Your petitioners, the City of Lynchburg, a municipal cqr-
poration, and R. W. B. Hart, its City Man ger, respectfully 
ask that an appeal be granted them from a ecree entered by. 
the Corporation Court of the City of Ly chburg on Feb-
·ruary 14, 1939, in a chancery suit in which petitioners wer~ 
defendants and the Dominion Theatres, Inc. was plaintiff. 
· The said decree sustained the motion o! the plaintiff to 
strike the joint answer of the defendants t the bill of com-
plaint, and finally adjudicated the rights oft e parties to said 
~~~;;t. There is filed herewith a ~opy of the relord in the lower 
· STATEMENT OFF ACTS. . 
The Dominion Theatres, Inc., is the op ator of certain 
moving picture theatres in the City of Ly chburg engaged 
in showing motion pictures and sound fil and reels, for 
_which exhibition it charges and coliects ad ·ssions from the 
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general public. In the month of January, 1939, it secured 
from the owners thereof a film known as '' The Birth of a 
Baby" with the permission from the owners *to exhibit 
2* it in the City of Lynchburg. The propriety of ~bowing 
this picture in the City of Lynchburg was evidently so 
doubtful to the management of the plaintiff that it gave a 
private preview of said picture to certain selected City offi-
cials and citizens (R., p. 3). The :film, as shown at such 
private exhibition, was of such character that the City 
Manager, with the approval of the Council of the City of 
Lynchburg, notified the man~gement of the plaintiff that said 
picture could not be publicly exhibited in the City of Lynch-
burg because it was obscene, indecent, immoral, inhuman or 
of such character that its exhibition would tend to corrupt 
morals or incite to crime, and that if the plaintiff attempted to 
exhibit said picture, its exhibition would be stopped, and the 
operators of the theatre arrested by the police for violating 
the City ordinances prohibiting the showing of obscene and 
indecent pictures. · 
Whereupon the plaintiff filed its bill in the Corporation 
Court for the City of Lynchburg alleging that the film had 
been submitted to the Division of Motion Picture Censorship 
of the State of ,Virginia, and that said Division properly 
examined the same, and ''concluding that no portion of said 
film is obscene, indecent, immoral, inhuman or of such charac-
ter that its exhibition would tend to corrupt morals or incite 
to crime issued a valid permit therefor" (R., pp. 2 and 3). 
The bill then alleges that after the private exhibition, the 
City Manager of the City of Lynchburg prohibited the show-
ing of said picture publicly in the City of Lynchburg, and 
advised the plaintiff that if an attempt was made to exhibit 
it publicly, the operators of the theatre would be arrested 
under the City ordinance prohibiting the exhibition of such 
picture. 
The bill further alleges that the picture is not obscene, 
indecent, etc., and that the State Division of Motion Pic-
3• ture *Censorship, having issued a permit for the film to 
be exhibited in the State of Virginia, the City does not 
have the right to prohibit it, because the Legislature has 
vested the entire control of the exhibition of motion pictures 
in the Division of Motion Picture Censorship, and that this 
supersedes the rights of the City under its charter with re-
spect to motion pictures. . 
The bill further alleges that an actual controversy has 
arisen between the plaintiff and the defendants, and asks that 
an injunction be granted prohibiting the City of Lynchburg 
or the City l\fanager or any of its police officers from inter-
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fering with the exhibition of the picture, ' The Birth of a 
Baby", or any other film for which permit as been secured 
from the Division of Motion Picture Censo ship. 
To this bill the defendants filed their joint answer. In the 
second clause of said answer (R., pp. 9 and ) it was denied 
that the Division of Motion Picture Censorsh p had approved 
the public exhibition of said film in the State of Virginia, but, 
on the contrary, had refused to grant a permi therefor on the 
ground that it was obscene, indecent, etc., fr m which ruling 
the owner of the said film had appealed to t e Circuit Court 
for the City of Richmond, and the said con t, after hearing 
the case, entered an order directing the Di ision of Motion 
Picture Censorship to issue the permit, , · ch, under the 
said court's ruling, had been done. 
The defendants further denied ( Clause 6 of the Answer, 
R., p. 11) that, because the permit for the ,e ibition of said 
film in the State of Virginia had been grante by the Division 
of Motion Picture Censorship under the ord r of the Circuit 
Court for the City of Richmond, the City of Lynchburg had 
no authority to regulate and control' t e exhibition of 
4*' said film or to prohibit its sho,ving in the *City of Lynch-
burg, under the power given to the Cit of Lynchourg 
by its charter. The provisions of the City c iarter relied on 
by the City will be set forth in the argument. 
The plaintiff then filed its motion to strike out the def end"" 
ants' answer on the following grounds (R., p. 17-19): 
(1). That there was outstanding a valid ermit from the 
Division of Motion Picture Censorship of irginia that the 
said .film might be exhibited in Virginia, an that the gra1,1t-
ing of the permit, after the hearin~ in the frcuit Court of 
, Richmond, had as its legal effect that no po tion of the film 
was obscene, indecent, etc. 
(2). Thµ,t defendants relied solely upon t 1e provision of 
the charter of the City of Lynchburg for th ir authority to 
prevent the exhibition of the :film. 
(3). That the State of Vir~inia bv the enact 1ent of Sections 
378 (a) and following of the Code of Viru;inia, ad occupied the 
ent.ire field of motion picture <1ensorship, and that, therefore. 
the City had no right to act under its chart r provision. 
· (4). That the powers asserted by the Cit , being in con-
flict with the powers reserved by the State i its motion pic-
ture censorship act, were in ronflict with th State law, and 
were void. 
(5). Thnt by reason of tl1e insufficiency i , law of the dP-
fens~s set up in the answer, the plaintiff is entitled to ex-
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hi bit the said picture without inter£ erence from the defend-
ants. 
After argument and time for consideration, the lower court 
handed down its written opinion, which is made a pa1-t of the 
record (R., pp. 20-32). Pursuant to thiR opinion, the court 
entered the order on February 14, 1939 (R., pp. 3fj-35), strik-
ing out the answer of the defendants, .taking the bill for con-
fessed, and holding that as the motion picture film, '' The 
5• Birth of a Baby", had 6 been duly licensed by the Division 
of Motion Picture Censorship of the State of Virginia, 
the complainant has the right to exhibit said film within the 
City of Ly11chburg. The court declined to pass upon the 
plaintiff's right to exhibit any other picture in the City of 
Lynchburg, and declined to grant the injunction asked for, 
holding that it having declared the rights of the parties to 
exhibit the said film, it was not necessary to _grant an injunc-
tion. A suspension orde.r for thirty days was included. 
THE QUESTION INVOLVED. 
Does the City of Lynchburg, under the police powers 
granted it by its charter, have the power or authority to pro-
hibit an indecent motion picture film being exhibited in the 
City of Lynchburg when such film has been duly licensed by 
the Division of Motion Picture Censorship of the State of 
m~n~, ' 
ARGUMENT. 
There are two questions which must be considered in arriv-
ing at the proper conclusion: 
(1).. Irrespective of any general State law, does the City of 
Lynchburg have the power to prohibit the exhibition of ob-
scene or indecent films! 
( 2). If so, has this power been superseded, repealed, or re-
voked by the enactment of the Motion Picture Censorship Act, 
and the power to pass upon indecent pictures vested solely in 
the Division of Motion Picture Censorship? 
I. The City Has the Power. 
The charter of the City of Lynchburg as a whole was 
enacted by the General Assembly of Virginia in 1928. (Acts 
City of" Lynchburg·, etc., v. Dominion Th atres, Inc. 5 
of 1928, pages 899, et seq.) Section 38 as amended and 
6"" re-enacted in 1938. ( Acts of *1938, p es 217, et seq.) 
This section so far as pP.rtinent here i. the same under 
the 1938 act as under the 1928 act. It pro ides in the first 
general clause of said section (R., pp. 12 an 13): 
'' Section 38. The council shall have all th general powers 
vested in it by the Constitution and laws f the State, and 
·it shall ha.ve power to enact ordinances p oviding for the 
exercise within its jurisdiction of all poli e powers which 
the State itself may exercise under the Co stitution, except 
such as may be specially denied cities by a t of the General 
Assemb~y; and shall further have power:'' 
And in the 26th clause of Section 38 : 
"Twenty-sixth. To regulate and contr l auction sales, 
livery stables, garages, gasoline filling st ions, slaughter-
houses, theatrical performances or other pu lie shows or ex-
hibitions, the hiring or use for pay or carria~e.s, carts, wagons 
and drays, automobiles and other automothre vehicles, and 
the business of hawkers, peddlers, persons elling goods by 
sample, persons keeping billiard tables, t pin alleys and 
pistol galleries for pro.fit, and all othe · similar busi-
nesses and occupations and employments, and as to such 
trades, occupations and employments, and any other of a 
like nature, may grant or refuse license s it' may deem 
proper.'' 
And in the 35th clause of Section 38: 
'' Thirty-fifth. To pass all by-laws, rules and ordinances 
not repugnant to the Constitution and laws o the State which 
it may deem necessary for the good order and government 
of the city, the management of its propert , the conduct of 
its affairs, the peace, comfort, convenienc , order, morals, 
health and protection of its citizens or their roperty, and do 
such other thinp;s and pass sucl1 other laws s may be neces-
sary or proper to carry into full effect anv ower, authority, 
capacity, or jurisdiction, which is o·r shall e granted to or 
vested in said city. or in the council. court r officers there-
of, or which may be necessarily incident to municipal cor-
poration.'' 
It will be seen from a reading of these rovisions of the 
charter of the City of Lynchburg that all t e police powers 
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of the State itself are vested in the City, an~ can be exercised 
. by it unless by some other act of the Assembly they are 
specifically denied to •the City, or taken away from it. 
7* It needs no citation of authorities to sustain the position 
that if the State can prevent the exhibition of obscene 
and indecent motion picture films, the City can do so. The 
City was not only given all the police powers of the State, 
but under the 26th clause of Section 38 of the charter, was 
expressly given the authority to regulate and control any 
public shows or exhibitions, and to prohibit the same. 
Acting under the powers granted it by its charter, the City 
of Lynchburg enacted an ordinance, which is Section 80 of 
the City Code, last enacted in the City Code of 1931, and 
which so far as pertinent, is as follows (R., p. 14): 
"Section 80. * *' * (b). It shall be unlawful for any theatri-
cal or opera troupe, the manager of any motion picture house, 
or other organizations, person, firm or corporation, to pro-
duce any show, opera or play, to exhibit any picture, or any 
other entertai~ment in which there is any indecent display, 
obscene, vulgar, or licentious language or immoral plot, or for 
the manager of any show, play or opera house, moving picture 
house, or other building under his control, to permit any such 
. show, play, opera or moving picture as is above prohibited. 
Any person, firm, or corporation, who shall violate this ordi-
nance, 8hall be fined not less than $10.00 nor more than 
$300.00 for each offense. And upon satisfactory evidence, the 
City Manager is authorized and empowered to prohibit the 
production or exhibition of any such show, play, opera, pic-
ture or entertainment.'' 
It will be noted that this section gives to the City Manager 
the power to prohibit the exhibition of any such obscene or 
indecent picture. No point is made in the bill that if the 
City has the power under its charter to forbid the exhibition 
of the picture in question, the City Manager is ,vithout au-
thority to enforce this ordinance, and, therefore, the court'~ 
time will not be taken up with the discussion of this question, 
except to say that Section 13 of the City charter make~ 
8* the City Manager the administrative head of the ""City of 
· Lynchburg, and Section 14, Clause First, provides that it 
shall be his duty to see that all laws and ordinances are in 
force (R., pp. 13 and 14), and the ordinance above cited 
expresslv places in him the authority and duty of prohibiting 
the showin~ of obscene or indecent films. The case of Taylor 
v. Sm.ith, 140 Va. 217, decided by this court in 1924 is the lead-
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ing case in Virginia, upholding the authorit of an adminis-
trative officer to pass upon discretionary tters. Block v. 
Chicago, 239 Ill. 251, 87 N. E. 1011, cited i the opinion in 
the case of Taylor v. Smith, was a motion p· cture case which 
upheld such powers as those sought to be nforced here by 
the City Manager. 
II. The City's Power Has Not Been 8upe1.·seded, Repealed 
or Revoked. 
The bill alleges (R., p. 4) that full, complet and sole power 
of making an inquiry into the fitness of an motion picture 
to be shown in the City of Lynchburg has b en vested in the 
Division of Motion Picture Censorship, and hat the City haEl 
no power to prohibit the showing of "The Bi ·h of a Baby''. 
There has been no express repeal of th City's charter 
powers. On the other hand, the charter ,po ers under which 
the City is proceeding in this case, have bee enacted and .r~-
enacted in 1938. (Acts of 1938, pages 271, et eq.) The Act of 
1930 setting up the Division of Motion Pi ture Censorship 
(Virginia Code, Sections 378(a)-378(j)) do s not expressly 
repeal any other acts of the General Assem ly, and particu.: 
larly the Lynchburg cl1arter, · but clearly s ows on its face 
that it was not the intention of the Gene al .. A.ssembly to 
repeal such laws. Section 378 (h), a part 'f · that act, pro-
vides: 
"378(h)-Enforcing Act. The Division sh 11 have authority 
to enforce · the provisions and purposes of this act; but 
9• this shall not be *construed to relieve a y State or local 
peace officer in the State -from the du y otherwise· im-
posed, of detecting and prosecuting~ viola t' ons of the laws 
of the State of Virginia. In carrying out a d enforcing the 
purposes of this act, the Division may make all needful rules 
and regulations not inconsistent with the 1 ws of the State 
of Virginia. '' 
One of the duties otherwise imposed of <let cting and prose-
cuting violations is imposed under Section 549 of the Vir-
ginia Code, which also relates to immoral p · tures. Another 
law of the State of Virginia is the clrnrter p ov'ision granting 
to the City the right to reg·ulate and contr 1 theatrical per-
formances. It is perfectly apparent that i using the lan-
guage of Section 378(h), the General Asse ly realized that 
there were other laws in effect dealing with t eatrical produc-
tions, and it did not intend in passing the ct to say that a 
ruling by the Division of Motion Picture Ce sorship granting 
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a permit would prevent other duly constituted authoritie~ 
from prohibiting the exhibition of the picture on grounds 
of obscenity or otherwise. We cannot agree with the op~nion 
of the lower court that this provision of the law was put in 
Section 378(h) solely for the purpose of enabling local police 
officers to prohibit the showing of a picture for which no 
license had been granted by the Division of Motion PicturP 
Censorship. The provision of this section clearly relate~ 
to the duty otherwise imposed of detecting and prosecuting 
violations of other laws with reference to the showing of 
objectionable pictures. The General Assembly must have an-
ticipated that there would be cases where the local officer~ 
would have to detect and prosecute the showing of obscene 
pictures regardless of any ruling of the Division of Motiou 
Picture Censorship. 
10• *The Provisions of the City Charter Are Not R·epealed 
by Implication. 
The provisions of S'ection 38 of the City charter he1·c perti-
nent have been in the charter for many years. The 1·c:Hmact-
ment of this section in 1938, after the Act of 1930 establishing 
the Division of Motion ]?icture Censorship, is not regarded 
as particularly important, though it is a special act follow-
ing the general act of 1930. Even without this re-enactment 
of Section 38 in 1938, it is a well established principlf! of 
law that specific and special acts are not to be regarded 
as repealed by general acts unless the two are in such con-
flict that they cannot be given effect. 
This principle was decided by this court in 1935 in the 
case of Scott v. Lichford, 164 Va. 419, which was a suit brought 
to enjoin the issuance of bonds by the City of Lynchburg 
under the provisions of the City charter on the ground that 
the provisions of Section 4 of the charter had been repealed 
by implication by the later enactment by the General Assem-
bly of a general law controlling the issuance of bonds by 
municipalities. In that case the court said: 
"Counsel for appellant concede that there is no expressed 
repeal of the charter provisions of the City by Section 
3090(a). Hence it follows that there must be strong indi-
cations of an intention to repeal by implication. 
"Repeal by implication is not favored, and the firmly es-
tablished principle of law is, that where the two statutes 
are in apparent confliet, it is the duty of the court, if it be 
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:reasonably pos~ible, to give to them such construction as 
'Y~l g~ve f9rce ~µd eff~ct ~o each. 36 Cyc. 146. · 
".In K ir. kpatrick v. ]Joqrd of 8. u,pervis,rs of Arlingfo'"(l 
Cownty, 146 Va. 113, 136 S. E. 186, 190, it s held that there 
may be both a general and ·a ·sp·ecial act referring to the 
same matter, the court. s~ytng: 'It i~ ~ we~~ settled principl~ · 
of l~w that w~ere two statutes ar~ m appatent conflict they 
should be so constru~d, if re~sonably possib e, so as to allow 
both to stand, and t'o give f q·rce and effect o each. 36 Cyc. 
114~, citing many cases.' ' 
11 * *'' 'The doctrine that a special act sh .uld b~ constru~d 
as an exception to the general law is ot to be invoked 
unless the two acts cannot be harmonized or reconciled in 
any other way. There are a number of i stances in ,Vir-
ginia where general acts· ·and' spechd acts a ply in the same 
qounty at the same time. See Fergitson v. f oard of Super: 
visors, 133 Va. 561, 113 S. E. 860.' 
"In McQuilla.n ·on Municipal Corporatiofs, S'ection 875~ 
the rule is stated as follows : I 
! ' 'Where a contrary intention is not manifest, the generaJ 
rules relating to repeals by general laws of c arter and ordi-
nance provisions and legislative acts applica le to municipal 
corporations, which, in effect, become cons ituent parts of 
their charter, may be thus summarized: · 
'' '(1). Constructive repeals or repeals by implication are 
not favored. · · 
" '(2). A later statute which is general oes not repeal 
a former one that is particular unless neg tive words· are 
used, or the acts are so entirely inconsisten that they can-
not stand together. Thus laws existing fo the benefit of 
particular municipalities ordinarily are not r pealed by geu~ 
eral laws relating to the same subject-matter. Stated in dif-
ferent phrase, where the subsequent general law and prior 
special law, charter or ordinance provisio s do not con-
flict, they both stand, but this result must de end, of course, 
upon the legislative intent whicl1 is to be a certained from 
an examination and comparison of the whole ·ourse of legi:::l-· 
lation relating to the subject under conside tion.' '' 
10 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
The appellants confidently assert that the act setting up 
the Division of Motion Picture Censorship does not come 
within the general rule that where a later act seeks to revise 
the entire subject matter and contains additional provisionf-l 
not contained in the prior act, the later act· repeals the for~ 
mer by implication. There is no reason why the Act of 1930 
establishing the Division of Motion Picture Censorship and 
the City charter ( and .. the ordinance adopted thereunder) giv-
ing the City the right to prohibit obscene or indecent pictures 
. cannot both be recognized and both apply at the same 
12• time. The policy *of the State is to keep theatres from 
exhibiting obscene pictures, and not only has the State 
passed the censorship act, but a long time prior thereto it 
enacted a law codified in Virginia Code as Section 4549, which 
makes it a misdemeanor to exhibit such pictures. The policy 
of the State is the same as is evidenced .PY the ordinance of 
the City of Lynchburg here under consideration. 
There is nothing novel or strange about the State and the 
City both exercising duties of inspection and prohibition over 
the same subject. The State provides for the inspection of 
gasoline, but not one gallon can be sold in Lynchburg until it 
has been ·inspected and passed by the City Inspector. The 
State has inspectors of milk, food and food products, but the 
City has more rigid requirements in some -respects than has 
the State, and these City requirements have to be met before 
milk and other products can be sold in the City. The argu-
ment was made by the plaintiff in the lower court, and fol-
lowed by the Judge of the lower court in his opinion, that a 
motion picture lawful in Richmond could not be declared un-
lawful in Lynchburg. The argument does not hold up when 
considered in the light of principle and practice. 
Milk which meets the requirements of the State inspec-
tion could be lawfully sold in Campbell County, but because 
it does not meet the stricter requirements of the City ordi-
nance, it would be unlawful to sell it in the City of Lynch-
burg. There is no question raised that the localities cannot 
enact laws for the protection of the health and morals of 
their citizens which are stricter than the State requirements. 
That right has long been conceded by the courts, and the whole 
theory of the State s~tatutes and the decisions of the court 
uphold that principle. It even applies in the case of motion 
pict"Qres with reference to Sunday exhibition. While it 
13* is true that *some of the lower courts have held that 
the exhibition of motion pictures on Sunday is '' a neces-
sity" and, therefore, not in violation of the State law with 
respect to workh1g on Sunday ( the correctness of which de-
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cision is subject to serious question) we now of no case 
which holds that if the City, with the gene al police powers 
which the· City of Lynchburg has under · s charter, were 
to pass an ordinance prohibiting the exhi ition of moving 
pictures on Sunday as being against good morals aud the 
general welfare of the citizens of the City, · would not be a 
valid enactment. 
That it is the policy of the General Assemli>ly to leave ques-
tions involving the propriety of certain act~ to the localities 
and their citizens and police officers, is sliown by the act 
governing the sale of alcoholic beverages iin the State of 
Virginia. The sale of beer and wine is m de legal in Vir-
ginia, and a State Board has been created o pass upon the 
conditions under which such beverages ma be sold. This 
Board makes rules which control the entir State, but the 
localities have the right to say whether or not these bever-
ages may be sold within the bounds of th particular City 
or County, and whether or not they can be sold on Suriday. 
It may be, and it is, perfectly legal to sell eer and wine in 
Richmond or Amherst County, and it ma · be outside the 
law to sell it in Lynchburg if the locality so determines, not-
withstanding the fact that the State Board has been set up 
to control it. The sale of beer in Lynchburg during the week 
days may be lawful, but if the City so depides it may be 
just as unlawful to sell it on Sunday. I 
In Shaw v. Nor/ olk, 167 Va. 346 ( 1937), ie question was 
raised that because the State had passed a 1 w upon the sub-
ject of drunken driving, the City ordinance n the same sub-
ject was not valid. The opinion by Justi e Hudgins sets 
forth the complete police *powers of e City of Nor-
14 * folk under its charter, which are not more expansive 
than those granted to the City of Lynch urg by its char-
ter. He states, referring to driving while runk: 
'' Such an act is so fraught with po ten ti 1 danger to the 
lives and property of the inhabitants of populous city 
that it should be held invalid, unless the o inance violatn~ 
some positive mandate.'' 
Can it not as ,,rell be said that the showin of obscene pic-
tures is fraught with so much danger to t morals of the 
citizens that the ordinance should be held valid unless it 
violates some positive mandate t There is o positive man-
date in the moving picture censorsl1ip act which prohibits 
the City of Lynchburg from prohibiting tl e exhibition of 
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obscene or indecent pictures, or one which seems, on satis-
factory evidence, obscene or indecent to the city authorities. 
In upholding the validity of the Norfolk ordinance in the 
Shaw case, on page 351 of the opinion, attention is specifically 
called to the acts of the Legislature in connection with other 
violations of traffic laws where the City's power to control 
was expressly limited, the court saying : 
''In each instance the ·power of the locality to deal with 
the subject is either expressly denied or expressly granted 
under certain named limitations.'' 
It is respectfully submitted that the Motion Picture Censor-
ship Act contains no express limitations on the power of the 
cities to forbid the exhibition of obscene and indecent pic-
tures. The act is silent on the subject. It is respectfully 
submitted, and with all deference to the learned judge of the 
lower court, who refers to the title of the censorship act 
of 1930 in his opinion (R., p. 30) that the words '' of all 
matters' connected therewith'' referred only to such action 
as might be connected with the administration of the act by 
the Division of Motion Picture Censorship, and not with 
15~ *respect to provisions of city charters, which g·ive the 
cities powers here asserted by th~ City of Lynchburg. 
If it had been the intention of the Legislature to take 11way 
all powers of the cities in connection with the exhibition of 
obscene or indecent pictures, the Legislature would have said 
expressly, as it said in the traffic law, that the powers of the 
City were limited. It said no such thing in the motion picture 
act. 
As heretofore stated, the City of Lynchburg is given ex-
press authority under its charter to regulatP. and control all 
kinds of theatrical performances. It is also given express 
authority to regulate and control the sale of gasoline in the 
City, to adopt and enforce regulations with respect to the 
keeping and sale of milk, fresh meat and other food products, 
and to provide for the erection and safe consfruetion of houses 
within the City. All of these subjects a!e covered by State 
laws, and in most cases State Boards have been created to 
deal with them. In practically every case, the City restric-
tions and regulations are more rigid than those of the State, 
yet they are upheld. There is no conflict between the City char-
ter and the ordinance enacted thereunder and the State law 
with respect to the exhibition of moving pictures, and the 
City requirements are more rigid than those of the State. 
Why should the City of Lynchburg have forced upon them a 
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picture which they regard as obscene or ii decent simply be-
cause it was duly passed by the State Boar ! In the instant 
case it should be remembered that the D vision of Motion 
Picture Censorship found the picture obsc ne and indecent. 
and refused the State permit, and only iss ed it because the 
Circuit Court of Richmond ordered them t do so. 
In a recent Massachusetts case of Brielma v. Commissioner 
of P1.1,blic Health of Pittsfield (Mass. Sup . Jud. C. T., Oct. 
29, 1938) *(6 U. S. L. W. K. 306, N v. 15, 1938), the 
16'' court held: 
'' Power of City to impose standards st ~icter than those 
of the State. The regulation of the City Bo rd of Health pro-
hibiting the sale of milk which is neither pa teurized nor· cer-
tified, was held not void as in conflict wi h regulations of 
the State Milk Regulation Board, although the effect of the 
City regulation was to prohibit the sale in he City of three 
of the grades of milk approved by the State oard. The State 
law does not declare that every grade of m k established by 
the State Board may be sold everywhere. Local Boards of 
Health retain all their powers under are laws, and may 
make regulations that are more stringent tln the State law. 
Furthermore, the regulation by the City is constitutional 
as a valid exercise of the police power.'' 
In the instant case the State law nowhere d clares that every 
picture approved by the Division of Mot on· Picture Cen-
sorship may be shown in every City in t e State, and to 
use the language of the Massachusetts cou t, the regulation 
of motion pictures by the City is constitu ional as a valid 
exercise of its police powers. 
CONCLUSION. 
It is respectfully submitted that an a peal should be 
granted in this case, and the decree of the lower court re-
versed for the reasons hereinbefore set for , which may be 
briefly summarized as follows : 
(1). The City is given express authority nder its charter 
to regulate and control all theatrical perf rmances or ex-
hibitions, which power is as full as that of he State unles~ 
either abridged by act of the General Assei bly or repealed 
in expres~ed words or by implication by som other act of the 
General Assembly. 
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(2). The City charter powers have not been abridged, or 
repealed by expressed words in any other act. 
(3). They have not been repealed by implication. The 
Motion Picture Censorship Act of 1930 and the pro-
17* visions of the City charter *and ordinances adopted 
thereunder are not in conflict, and both can be sustained, 
and should both be given effect. 
(4). It is the well established policy of the State to leave 
matters concerning the health, safety, morals and general 
welfare to the citizens of the locality in all cases except where 
specifically declared otherwise by act of the Legislature, which 
is not the case here. 
This is a new and novel case in Virginia. In fact, we have 
been unable to find any reported case from any appellate 
court, upon the question of whether or not in a State having 
a State Board of Censors for moving pictures, which has 
granted a State permit to exhibit a certain picture in the 
State, a City having complete police powers with respect to 
the regulation of moving pictures can prohibit its showing 
in the City notwithstanding the granting of the permit by 
the State Board. As stated in the opinion of the lower court, 
this is not yet a question of fact, but a question of the power 
of the City. It is an important question which the Court of 
Appeals should pass upon so th.at the question may be settled 
once and for all time in the State of Virginia, and future 
litigation avoided. 
A copy of this petition, which is to be taken as the open-
ing brief of petitioners, was delivered to S. H. Williams, 
of counsel for the plaintiff, on the 25th day of February, 
1939. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CITY OF LYNCHBURG, 
R. W. B. HART, City Manager. 
By T. G. HOBBS, 
ROBT. D. MORRISON, 
Attorneys for Petitioners. 
I, T. G. Hobbs, the undersigned counsel, practicing in 
18* the *Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, do hereby 
certify that in my opinion the rulings of the decree of 
the Corporation Court for the City of Lynchburg in the above 
mentioned case are erroneous, and the said decree should be 
reviewed and reversed. 
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Given under my hand this 25th day of F ruary, 1939. 
Received February 27, 1939. 
A ppea.l allowed. No bond. 
Staunton. Va .. March 10, 19~9. 
Received March 11, 1939. 
RECORD 
,VIRGINIA: 
T. G. HOBBS. l B. WATTS. 
HEN Y W. HOLT. 
M. B. W. 
Pleas before the Honorable Aubrey E. trode, judge. of 
the corporation court for the city of L nchburg, at the 
courthouse thereof, on the 14th day of Fe ruary, 1939, and 
in the 163rd year of the Commonwealth. 
Be it remembered that heretofore, to-wit~ At Lynchburg 
Corporation Court, January 21st, 1939, the following order 
was entered, to-wit: 
Dominion Theatres, Inc., Plaintiff. 
v. 
City of Lynchburg, and R. W. B. Hart, City fanager thereof, 
Defendants. 
On motion of the plaintiff by counsel, lea e is given it to 
file its bill in this cause, and upon motion o the defendants 
by counsel, leave is given them to file their answer to said 
bill, and thereupon said bill and answer w re filP-d accord-
ingly, and this cause is ordered docketed and set for hearing. 
Thereupon, the plaintiff filed by leave of co rt its motion to 
strike the defendants' answer, to which mo ion the defend-
ants replied generally, and argument of con sel being heard, 
and the court not being advised of its jud ent or decree 
to be given in the premises, takes time to nsider thereof. 
And this cause is continued. 
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The bill, answer, and motion to strike, ref erred to in the 
foregoing order, are in the words and :figures following, to-
wit: 
page 2} BILL. 
To the HonorablP. Aubrey E. ,Ji1,d,qe, Judge of the Corpora-
tion Court for the City of Lynchburg: 
Your complainant, Dominion Theatres, Incorporated, a cor-
poration duly organized and existing under the laws of the 
State of Delaware and qualified to transact business in th~ 
State of Virginia, respectfuliy shows unto this Honorable 
Court that it is engaged in the b·usiness of exhibiting at its 
place of amusement in the City of Lynchburg, designated a~ 
the Paramount The~tre, motion and sound picture films and 
reels for which exhibits it charges and collects admissions 
from the public, for which purpose it has complied with the, 
laws of the State of Virginia, and the 'ordinances of thP 
City of Lynchburg with respect to licenses for the conduct 
of such business. 
Your complainant. further shows that it has lawfully ac-
quired from the owners thereof the right to exhibit on January 
25, 1939, at its Paramount Theatre in the City of Lynchburg, 
Virginia, a motion and sound picture film entitled "The Birth 
of a Baby", and was until the making of threats on the part. 
of the City of Lynchburg, hereinafter more particularly re-
ferred to, preparing to exhibit the same. Your complainant 
further shows that the said motion picture film has been sul1-
mitted to the Division of Motion Picture Censorship, duly 
created and established under the laws of the State of Vir-
ginia, which said Division promptly examined the same and 
concluding that no portion of said film is obscene, indecent, 
immoral, inhuman or of such a character that its exhibition 
would tend to corrupt morals or incite to crime, 
page 3 ~ issued a valid permit therefor, which said permit 
is at this time in full force and effect. Your com~ 
plainant files herewith, as Exhibit "A", a. certified copy of 
the permit issued by said Division of Motion Picture Cen-
sorship, which it prays may be read as a part of this bill. 
Your complainant further shows that in contracting with 
the owners thereof for the right to exhibit the film aforesaid 
complainant agreed that in the exhibition thereof no other 
f ea.tu re motion picture would be shown in conjunction there-
with, that complainant would not distribute, release or exhibit 
undue or improper advertising thereof, and that it would not. 
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directly or indirectly, enter into any contra t or arrangement 
-for exploitation of said film in such mann r as to advertize. 
directly or indirectly, any product whatso ver, and has an-
nounced as a portion of its program for t e showing there-
of that no person under the age of sixteen ould ·be admitted 
thereto unless accompanied by their pare t or guardian. 
Your complainant further shows unto y ur Honor that ii 
has given a preliminary showing of said lm in the City of 
Lynchburg, at its theatre a:f oresaid, and pon its invitation 
and without charge for admission represe tative citizens of 
the City of Lynchburg attended the exhib tion thereof, and 
that on the day following said exhibition co plainant 's agents 
were informed by the City of Lynchbur ·, acting through 
its City Manager, that the public exhibiti n of said picture 
at its aforesaid theatre in the City of Lynch urg is prohibited, 
and that upon any attempt upon the part of its managers, 
operatives or agents to exhibit the same, sue exhibition would 
be stopped by the Police Department of aid City and the 
said Managers, operatives and agents would be 
page 4 r arrested and fined. 
Your complainant is advised a d therefore avers 
that there being in full force and effect at this time a vali.d 
permit. issued by the Division of Motion · cture Censorship 
of the State of Virginia, for the public exh bition of the said 
film, it is within its legal rights in so doi g and is entitled 
to exhibit the same free from any interfere ce, prohibition or 
regulation on the part of the. City of Lyn hburg or its City 
Manager or Police Department, or any o cial, representa-
tive or employee thereof. Your complain nt further avers 
that such threatened interference on the p rt of the City of 
Lynchburg with complainant's proposed sh wing of said film, 
or any delay resulting from the thrPats and rohibit.ion afo.re-
said, will constitute an unwarranted, illegal and improper act. 
on the part of the said City of Lynchburg, or its City Manager. 
for which no legal rights or powers are v sted in said City 
or City Manager by its charter or by the aws of the Statt,) 
of Virginia, and will result in irreparable i jury to this com 
plainant. Complainant is advised and ther fore charges thut 
the said City has no right, power or au ority to inquirt> 
into or pass upon the question whether t e film aforesaid, 
which has been duly licensed by said Divisi n of Motion Pie 
ture Censorship, or any other film for wh ch such a permit 
has been issued, is obscene, indecent, im ral, inhuman or 
of such a character as its exhibition woul tend to corrupt 
morals or incite to crime, but full, comple and sole powe1· 
for such inquiry and for issuing permits for ublic exhibitions 
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of such films complainant avers has been vested by law in the 
said Division of Motion Picture Censorship. Com-
page 5 } plainant is further advised and the ref ore charge~ 
that a recognition of any right on the part of said 
City of Lynchburg to inquire into any questions relating to 
the character: of this or any other film licensed and permitted 
by the Division of Motion Picture Censorship aforesaid, upon 
the question whether the same is obscene, indecent, immoral, 
inhuman or of such a character that its exhibition would tend 
to corrupt morals or incite to crime, would effectively imposJ~ 
upon this complainant impracticable and intolerable condi-
tions in the operation ·of its business, not contemplated, per-
mitted or justified by the laws of the State of Virginia in 
such cases made and provided, and would result in irreparablP 
injury to this complainant. 
Your complainant further alleges that an actual contro-
versy has · arisen between this complainant and the City of 
Lynchburg with respect to the right of said City to censor 
motion and sound picture films and reels proposed to be 
exhibited by this complainant, which have been duly licensed 
or permitted by the Division of Motion Picture Censorship 
aforesaid, and that accordingly this Court has jurisdiction 
to determine said controversy and to adjudicate and declar~ 
said right under its general equity powers and under the 
Act of the General Assembly approved March 8, 1922, Vir-
ginia Code, S-ection 6140(a). 
Wherefore, your complainant, being remediless save in a 
court of equity, where such matters are properly cognizable, 
prays that the City of Lynchburg and R. W. B. Hart, its City 
Manager, may be made parties defendant to thi~ 
page 6 ~ bill and required to answer the same, but not under 
oath, answer under oath being hereby expressly 
waived; that a temporary injunction may be issued, 
if proper, and a decree may be entered perpetually enjoin-
ing and restrah1ing the said City of Lynchburg, its City 
Manager and Police Officers, from interfering with the proper 
exhibition by this complainant of the motion picture film 
aforesaid, and of any other motion picture films and reels 
which have been duly licensed and permitted by the Division 
of Motion Picture Censorship of the State of Virginia, or from 
threatening, coercing, intimidating or otherwise interfering 
with the proper exhibition thereof, and that this Court will 
~nter a binding adjudication of right as between this com-
plainant ·and the said City of Lynchburg, adjudicating and 
declaring the ri~ht of this complainant to make proper ex-
l1ibition of the film aforesaid, and of any other films for 
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the exhibition of which a valid license or permit. has been 
-issued as aforesaid; and that this com lainanf may be 
awarded such other, further and general r lief as to equity 
may see meet and the necessities of the c se may require. 
And yonr complainant will ever pray, et 
DOMINION THEATRES, IN ORPORATED, 
By V{. ,v. GRIST, JR., 
Manager. 
"WILLIAMS & ROBERTSON, 
Attorneys for complainant. 
(Notary's certificate omitted in this tra. script.) 
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Form 3 
Total amount paid :-$14.00. 
Permit ~rial No, Oe-4965 
print #l 
Division of Motion Picture Cens rship. 
r
iclunond, V ~ 
Permit. 
This is to Certify, that Special Pictures Corporation 
(Robert Barton, representing) has submitte to the Division 
of Motion Picture Censorship of the State of Virginia for 
examination and license motion pieture reel , entitled Birth 
of a Baby with a total footage of 6,229 line 1 feet, to be ex-
hibited and displayed in the State of Virgini ; and that there 
has been paid a fee of $2.00 for each 1,000 feet or fraction 
thereof. 
This further certified that in the judg·i;ne and discretion 
of the Division of Motion Picture Ceusorshi , said film com-
plies with the law of the State of Virgini . 
Maker of film American Committee on M ternal Welfare. 
Issued at Richmond, this 24 day of Septe ber, 1938. 
ECW 
DIVISION OF MO ON PICTURE 
CENSORSHIP, 
(Signed) PETER SAUNDE , Director. 
'20 · Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
'l;he Division Reserves the Right to Revoke this License. 
This certificate does not entitle the holder to exhibit the 
duplicate print of this film. 
17 January 1939. 
To Whom It May Concern: 
I hereby certify that the attached document is a true and 
real copy of Certificate issued to Special Pictures 
page 8 r Corporation for the film entitled Birth of a Baby, 
said certificate issued by the Division of Motion 
Picture Censorship in accordance with Court Order given 
by the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond. 
ELIZABETH CARY WILLIAMSON, Clerk. 
(Notary's certificate omitted fa this transcript.) 
page 9 t ANSWER. 
The joint answer of the City of Lynchburg and R W. B. 
Hart, City Manager of said City, to a bill of complaint filed 
against them by Dominion Theatres, Inc. in the Corporation 
. Court for the City of Lynchburg. 
For answer to so much of said bill as these respondents are 
advised it is necessary and proper that they should answer, 
they answering say: 
(l). The allegations in the first paragraph of said bill an~ 
admitted. 
(2). Respondents are advised and allege that the allega-
tions of the second parag-raph of the bill are not in all re-
spects correct. Respondents are advised that on the sub-
mission of the motion picture film, "Birth of a Baby", to 
the Division of Motion Picture Censorship of the State of 
Virginia for a license to exhibit said film within the State 
of Virginia, the licem;;e wa:;; refused by said Divi~ion; that 
under the provisions of law relating thereto the owners of 
said film appealed from the decision of said Division of Mo-
tion Picture Censorship to the Circuit Court for the City of 
Richmond, and that said court reversed the action of the 
Division of Motion Picture Censorship, and ordered said 
Division to issue a permit which was accordingly done under 
the order of the court. It is denied that the Division of Mo-
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tion Picture Censorship of the State of V rginia approved 
thP. said motion picture film, and concluded that-
"No po1•tion of said film is obscene, inde ent, immoral, in-
human or of Rueb a character that its exhiljition would tend 
to corrupt morals or incite to c'rime: and strict-
page 10 ~ proof of the al1egations of this ara.graph of the 
bill is called for." 
(B). The allegations of the third paragra ' of said bill are 
neither dPnied nor affirmed. 
( 4). The alle~:ations of the fomth pa rag aph of said bill 
are admitted. 
( 5). It is deniP.d that the plaintiff has th right to exhibit 
said motion picture in the City of Lynchbt rg from any in ... 
terference, prohibition or rep:ulation on the part of the City 
of Lynchburg, or its City Manager, or Po ice Department, 
or any ,official, representative or employee t ereof, as alleged 
in the fifth par~graph of said bill. It is enied that the 
threatcmed interference by the City of Lyne burg or its City 
1Iana~:er with the showing of said film in s id City, or any 
delay resulting- from the alleged threats and rohibition afore-
said, will constitute an unwarranted, illegal nd improper act 
on the part of the City of Lynchhurg or it City Manager, 
for which no lep;al rfo:hts or powers are vc. ted in said City 
or Citv Manager by its Charter, or by the 1 ws of Virginia; 
and it is. expressly denied that any irrepa able injury will 
result to the plaintiff from any acts of the ff .y of Lynchburg· 
or the City Manager, or from any threatenc acts on the part 
of the Citv or City Manager as alleged in th fifth paragraph 
of Haid bill, and no allegations are made i the bill which 
F!liow or tend to show what irreparable injt ry would be in-
flicted on the· plaintiff. 
If no injunction is granted and the showin of said picture 
is delayed until a final dP.termination of the · ghts of the par-
tieR. the plaintiff can, if it Rhonld finally pr vail in this pro-
ceeding, show said picture at a later date ith equal return 
to itself. If the injnncti.on is gra tecl and the pie-
page 11 ~ ture shown, then irreparable ha.r will be done to 
the City and its citizens if it ~hot ld finally be de-
termined that the plaintiff was not entitle to the prayer 
of its bill. 
( 6). It is denied that because~ the Divisio of Motion Pic. 
ture Censorship has !!ranted, under an ord r of the Circuit 
flourt of the Citv of Richmond. n. permit t exhibit within 
the State of Vfrginia1 the said film, ''Birth f a Baby", that 
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the City of Lynchburg has no power to regulate and control 
the showing of said film, or to prohibit the showing of said 
film within the City of Lynchburg. 
The Act of 19il0 establi~hing the Division of Motion Pic-
ture Censorship, and providing rules for the operation there-
of, does not grant exclusive power to said Divi!:don to control, 
regulate and prohibit the showing of moving pictures in the 
cities of Virginia, and does not expressly or by implication 
repeal other general laws of the Sta.te or charter provisions 
of the City of Lynchburg. On the contrary, it expressly pro-
vides that said act "shall not be construed to relieve any 
state or local peace officer in the State from the duty other-
wise imposed of detecting and prosecuting violfltions of the 
laws of the State of Virginia." 
These respondents are advised and allege that said film 
is obscene, indecent, immoral, inhuman, and is of such char-
acter that its exhibition will tend to corrupt morals or incite 
to crime, and that the City of Lynchburg has f~1ll power and 
authority to prohibit the showing of said motion picture film 
within said City; and that the action of the City Manager in 
prohibiting the exhibition of said film within the City of 
·. Lynchburg was within the powers vested in the 
page 12 ~ City of Lynchburg by its charter and the g·cneral 
laws of the State of Virginia, and that the action 
of the City Manager in prohibiting the showing of said film 
within t.he City of Lynchburg was: within his leg-al powers. 
(7). Section 38 of the City Charter (Acts of Assembly of 
1928, pag·es 899, et seq . ., as .amended and reenacted in 1938, 
Acts of 1938, pages 271, et seq.) provides: 
"Section 38. The Council shall have all the general powers 
veBted in it by the Constitution and laws of the State, and it 
shall have power to enact orclinanceR providing for the ex-
ercise within its jurisdiction of all police powers which the 
State itsP.lf may exercise under the Constitution, except such 
as may be specially denied cities by acts of the General As-
sembly; and shall further have power: * * * 
'' Twenty-six. To reg·ulate and control auction sales, livery 
stables, garag-e8, gasoline filling· stations, slaughter houses, 
the1itrical performances or other public shows or exhibitions, 
the hiring or use for pay of carriag·es, carts, wagons and 
drays, automobiles and other automotive vehicles, and the 
business of ha:wkers, peddlers, persons selling· g·oods bv 
sample, persons keeping; billiard tables, ten phi alleys ancl 
pistol g·alleries for profit, and all other similar businesses 
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and · occupations and employments, and · as to such trades, 
occupations imd employments, and any-0the of a like nature, 
may grant or refuse license as it may deem roper. • • ,.. 
"Thirty-fifth. To pass all by-laws, rule and ordinances 
not repugnant to the Constitution and laws o the State which 
it may deem necessary for,.the go order and gov-
page 1.3 ~ ernment of the City, the manage ent of its prop-
erty, the conduct of its affairs, th peace, comfort, 
convenience, order, morals, health and prot ction of its citi-
zens or their property, and do such other thin s, and pass such 
other laws aR may be necessary or proper to carry into a full 
effect any power, authority, capacity, or juri diction, which is 
or shall be granted to or vested in said City, r in the Council, 
court· or officers thereof, or which may be necessarily inci-
dent to a municipal corporation.'' 
From the foregoing· it will be seen that t e police powers 
of the City of Lynchburg· are as wide as thos of the· Common-
wealth of Virginia, and unless especially p ohibited by the 
Acts of the General ... i\.ssembly, the City has tl right to do any 
and all thin~·s which fall within that power 
Section 4 of the City Charter is as follow : 
'' Section 4. The government and administ at.ion of the City 
shall be vested in one body, to be called th Council of the 
City of Lynchburg, and in one administrat ve officer, to be 
styled City Manager, and in such other dep rtments, boards 
and other officers as are hereinafter provid d for,. or as are 
permitted or required by law and appoint d by the Coun-
cil.'' 
Section 13 of the City Charter provides in parti •. . 
'' The City Manager sliall be the admini trative head of 
the municipal government * * .i:. '' 
Section 14 of the City Charter provides in part, and so 
far as is pertinent here, as follows: 
'• Section 14. The City Manager shall b responsible to 
the Council' for the efficient admi istration of all 
page 14 ~ affairs of the City. H~ shall ha e power, and it 
shalJ he his duty: 
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'' First. To see that all laws a.nd ordinances are enforced. 
'' Tenth. To perform all such other duties as may be pre-
scribed by law, or be required of him by ordinance or resolu-
tion of the Council.'' 
Pursuant to the authority given it under its charter, the 
Council of t~e City of Lynchburg has enacted an ordinance 
which is clause (b} of Section 80 Qf the City Code. This or-
dinance which was adopted at or p1-ior to the recodifi.cation 
of the ordinances of the City of Lynchburg, and set forth 
in the City Code of 1931, is as follo~s: 
'' (b). It shall be unlawful for any theatrical or opera 
troupe, the manager of any moving picture house, or other 
organization, person, firm or corporation, to produce any 
show, opera or play, to exhibit any picture, or any other enter-
tainment in which there is any indecent display, obscene, 
vulgar, or licentious langua_ge or immoral plot, or for the 
manager of any show, p]ay or opera house, moving· picture 
house, or other building under his control, to permit any such 
show, play, opera or moving picture as is above, prohibited. 
Any person, firm, or corporation, who shall violate this or-
dinance shall be fined not less than ten dollars nor more 
than three hundred dollars for each offense. And upon sat-
isfactory evidence the city manager is authorized and em-
powered to prohibit the production or exhibition of any such 
show, play, opera, picture or entertainment.'' 
This ordinance prohibits the exhibition within 
page 15 ~ the City of Lynchburg, of any picture in which 
there is any indecent display, obscene, vulgar or 
licentious languag·e, or immoral plot. Upon satisfactory evi-
den~e submitted to him the City Manager is authorized and 
empowered to prohibit the production or exhibition of any 
such show, play, opera, play or entertainment. 
F·ollowing the preliminary showing of said film, '' Birth of 
a Baby'', within the City of Lynchburg, as alleged in the 
fourth paragraph of the bill, satisfactory evidence wns pre-
sented to the City lVIanager to the effect that said film was 
indecent, obscene, vulgar and immoral, and would tend to 
corrupt morals, and acting within the po"ier conferred upon 
him by the Charter of the City of Lynchburg· and Section 
80 of the City Code, he prohibited the showing of said mo-
tion picture film within the City of Lynchburg·. 
(8). These respondents are advised and alleg·e: 
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(a). That.the granting· of a permit by th Divisi~n of Mo-
tion Picture Censorship to show a motion p· ture film. within 
the State of Virginia does not take away t e powers of the 
City of Lynchburg to prohibit the showing o said film in the 
City of Lynchburg if it violates the laws -o Virginia or the 
01·dinances of the City of Lynchburg. 
(b). That the police powers of the· City o Lynchburg are 
as wide as those of the State unless speci cally limited by 
the Acts of the General Assembly of Virgi ia, and that no 
act of the General Assembly of Virginia as in any way 
limited the power of the City of Lynchbur to prohibit the 
showing of said film, "Birth of a Baby", thin said City. 
( c) . That clause ( b) of Sectio 80 of the C.ity 
page 16 ~ Code is a valid ordinance of th 1City, and pro-
hibits the showing of said pictur within the City 
of Lynchburg. · 
(d). That under the charter provisions erein set forth, 
and under the provisions of said clause (b) of Section 80 of 
the City Code, the City Manager is veste with full legal 
powers to prohibit the showing of said film, nd that he acted 
within his leg·al powers in so doing. 
In consideration whereof, respondents ask that the· injunc-
tion asked for be refused, and that the bill e dismissed. 
And having fully answered, they pray, etc. 
CITY OF LYNC BURG, 
R. ,v. B. HART, ity Manager, 
of said ,City., 
By T. G. HOBBS, 
ROBERT D. MOR ISON, 
T eir Counsel. 
T. cJ. HOBBS, 
·R. D. MORRISON, p. d. 
page 17 } MOTION TO STRIKE HESPO TDENTS' AN· 
SWER. 
The complainant, by its attorneys, moves o strike out the 
joint am:;wer of respondents filed to compla nant 's bill and 
aseigns the following grounds for its motion 
(1) It appears from the a1l<1gations of the hill and the ad-
missions of the answer that there, is at this t me a valid per-
mit of the Division of Motion Pictnre Ce sorship of the 
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State of Virginia for the exhibition of the moving picture 
film entitled '' The Birth of a Baby,'' dated September 24, 
1938, authorizing· the exhibition thereof at any place of amuse-
ment in the State of Virginia for pay; and that the Division 
of Motion Picture Censorship issuing the same, after its 
rejection of said film and after the reversal of its :findings by 
the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond upon appeal, as 
provided by Virginia Code, Section 378-e, thereby stated in 
legal effect its conclusion that no portion of said film is 
obscene, inde:cent, immoral, inhuman or of such a character 
that its exhibition would tend to corrupt morals or incite to 
crime; 
(2) It appears that the respondents, City of Lynchburg 
and its representative and agent, the City Manager, rely for 
their right and authority to prevent the exhibition of said. 
film by complainant solely upon the provisions of the char-
ter of said City and upon the ordinances thereof a<lopteu 
under the authority of sueh charter provisions; 
(3) By virtue of the provisions of la:w contained in Vir-
ginia Code, Sections 378-a and following, enacted in 1930, 
the State of Virginia has occupied the entire field of motion 
picture censorship and of inquiring into the factual ques-
t.ion whether any motion picture film proposed to 
page 18 ~ be exhibited publicly in this State is objectionable 
by reason of the · characteristics aforesaid, which 
question has been adjudicated in the manner prescribed by 
said law in fayor of the propriety of exhibiting said film. In 
consequence of the occupation of said field by the- State and 
of the resulting reservation to itself of the exclusive right 
and power to pass upon all such questions, the said City of 
Lynchburg has no power, acting under the amendments to 
its charter granted by the Legislature of Virginia in 1928 
and 1'936, or under the provisions of its charter granted by 
the Act of Assembly dated ,January 29, 1896, to inquire into 
the question whether moving picture fi1ms approved in 
the manner prescribed by law are obscene or indecent or are 
objectionable for the other reasons set forth in said statute, 
or to regulate or control the· exhibition of any such film on 
the ground of its unfitness or impropriety for public exhibi-
tion, or to prevent or attempt or threaten to prevent the ex-
hibition of any such film, the exhibition of which the State 
of Virginia has permitted: 
( 4) The powers and rig·hts asserted by the City of Lynch-
burg and its City Manager, being in conflict ,vith the powers 
and rights of the State of Virginia reserved unto itself, the 
exercise of which the said State of Virginia has delegated 
City of Lynehbutg, etc., v. Dominion Th atres, Inc. 27 
to the Division of Motion Picture Censorshi and to the Cir-
cuit Court of the City of Richmond, the provi ions of the· char-
ter of said City and its ordinances made in p rsuance thereof 
are nu.11 and void and illfdfective to enable r authorize the 
respondents to inquire into the suitability f r public exhibi-
tion of motion picture films licen ed or permitted 
page 19 } by said Division of Motion Pictu e Censorship, or 
to prohibit tho production or e hibition of any 
such film or motion picture, or to fine the m nag·er or opera-
tives of any motion picture theatre for the roduction or ex-
hibition thereof; 
( 5) By reason of the insufficiency in law o the defenses set 
up in the answer aforesaid, complainant i entiled to the 
exhibition of said film, free from objection or interference 
by the respondents or from threats of proh bition or arrest 
and fine. 
DOMINION THEATRES, IN ORPORATED, 
y Counsel. 
. 
WILLIAMS & ROBERTSON, 
· Attorneys for complainant. 
page 20} MEMORANDUM OF OPINIO 
By ifa, bill vouching a license from the Ci :y of Lynchburg 
to conduct a moving picture theatre in the c ty and a permit 
license from the Division of Motion Picture ensorship of the 
State of Virginia to exhibit and display th~motion picture 
'' Birth of a Baby'', made by Americ.an Co . mittee on Ma-
ternal vVelfare, the said Division certifying '' hat in the judg-
ment and discretion of the Division of l\fotio Picture Censor-
ship, said film complies with the law of the St te of Virginia,'' 
the Complainant -charges that it has been p ohibited by the 
defendants, from showing the said picture publicly in the 
city and complainant's employees tlneatene with arrest if 
the-v shall so exhibit the said film. 
The complainant seeks a declaration of · s rights in the 
premises and prays an injunction enjoini g the City, its 
polic.c and other officP.rs, against interferin. with complain-
ant's exhibition of the moving· picture film foresaid and of 
any other motion picture films and reels , hich have been 
duly licen~cd and permitted by the Division o Motion Picture 
Censorship of the Sta.te of Virginia. 
By answer duly filed to the bill the City nd its Manager 
'' allege that said film is obscene, indecent, i oral, inhuman 
28 ~µpre~e 1Co1Jrt. 9f ~ppeals of Vi~gi¢a. 
r • · c • 
and is of such character that its exhibit.ion will tend to cor-
rupt 'moral arid' incite to crime,'' and assert the right to pro-
hipit: the ~bowing· qfthe s~id picture under the City ordinance 
making-unlawful the exhibition in the City of '' any picture, 
or any otp.er entertainment in .which there is any indecent 
. · · di~play, · ob~cene, vulgar, or licentious languag·e, or 
pag~ 21 ~ immora.l plot,'' whic4 ordinance is based ~pon as-
; · · · · _, • ~~rted .statut<:>ry c.h~rter _grant of aut~ority, both 
_g.~p.~ral. ~p19 ~pccrfi~, fo:r th~ _adoption there9f, m. the exer~ 
c1sc of poh~e ,power cluly .~elegatqd PY the State m general 
terms and sp'ecifically·fo ''regulate and contrpl * * * th~atrical 
p~rformances, or other public. shows or exhibitions'' and 
also ''to nas~ ~11 prdinane.~s not repugnant to the Constitu-
tipµ and laws of the State which. H m~Y deem ~ecessary for 
the 'good ori).er of the city* * ~ the pe~ce • * * order, mor~ls, 
health and protection 'of its citizens.'' · · 
This answer the complainant moves-. to strike out as insuf-
fiGie:qt in law, upon the ground; in substance,~ that the grant 
of permit and finding of the Division· of . Motion Picture 
Censorship embracing the subjec.t matter of the ordinauce 
constitute a finding by the State fin~l a11d conclusive and so 
binding upon municipalities, whi~h E!,re agencies of the State, 
as to preclude further and other exercise of the police power 
by a municipality in this regard. 
The question thus submitted for present determination is: 
-Does a permit from the Division of Motion Picture Censor-
ship, certifying· that a :film "complies ·with the law of the 
~tate of Virginia,'' prccfode ~h~ further ca]JJng· in question 
of the morality of the film by authority of a City ordinance Y 
. The merits of the picture "13irth of a Baby," good or baq, 
are not to· be passed Oll. Here the question is one of power, 
not Qf policy. · · 
. Fu:rtµer, upon the motion t.o strike it may be premiseq. that 
the al}eg·ation of the answer "t]~at said film is obscene, inde-
. cent, immoral, inhuman, ijnd is of such character 
page 22 } that its exhibition wili tend to eorrupt morals or 
, incite to crime,'' is tp be taken as the expres~io~ 
pf an opinion rather ~lian nR the stat~ment of a fact to be a~-
sumed as true. In law the inquiry is, what authority deter-
mines the qualities indic:mtPd? 
·. Upon familiar principles the right of censorship inheres 
in the sovereignty of the state in the exercise of the police 
mnv~r. 
That power the state may exercise directly through its own 
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enactments, statutes, and/or it may deleg e the power to 
municipalities to be also exercised throug · municipal or-
dinances. 
In Virginia for many years prior to 1922, as well as now, -
immoral theatrical exhibitions have been pe lized by statute 
and also by municipal ordinances adopted in some cities pur-
8uant to the grant by the State of charter au hority therefor, 
to parallel the state enactment but not to s persede or con-
flict therewith. · 
Thus prior to 1922 was left, in the main 
law enforcing· authorities a measure of cens 
ca] productions, including moving pictures. 
The preAent statute on the subject is Co e, Section 4549, 
providing·: "If any person * * * exhibit * * any books or 
other thing containing obscene language or ny * ~ * motion 
picture fi]m * * * manifestly tending to cor upt the morals· 
of youth t= ,[i, * he shall be guilty of a misde anor." 
The present apposite Lynchburg City O dinance is re-
ferred to and quoted from abeve, as relied o by the City in 
this case. 
page 23 } While the terms of the statute a d ordinance are 
not identical. thAy may be treated as synonymous 
in dealing- with the present issue, as may als the applicable 
languag·e of the Moving Picture Censorship statute herein-
after ref erred to and set out in part. 
Following the- widespread development of he moving pic-
ture industry the Virginia General AsRembl .. , by an Act ap-
1-,roved March 15, 1922 (Acts 1922, Chapter 257, page 434), 
entitled '' an Act to regulate motion picture lms and reels; 
providing a system of examination, approval and regulation 
thereof * * * and providing penalties'' provi ed for the ap-
J>ointmPnt of the Virginia State Board of C nsors of three 
members and made unlawful the exhibition o any film with-
out a vnlid license or permit first obtained th .refor from the 
Raid Board, and required that every film so a proved should 
so show by proper identification matter, wit provision for 
prosecution of violations before any magistr te or justice of 
the peace. 
After minor amendments in 1923 ( Acts 923, Cha.p. 85, 
p. 106)~ extensive amendments were made in 1930 (Acts 1930, 
Chap. 49. p. 49), providing, among other thi gs, now found 
in Section 378-a· and following of the Code, hat the Board 
of Motion Picture CensorR Rhoulcl he a divi ion in the De-
partment of Law and placed under the Atto ey General of 
the State and recognizing and providing fo the change in 
the motion JJicture industry from silent to so md films. 
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After viewing and reviewing '' Birth of a Baby'; 
page 24 ~ the Board of Moving Picture Censors in 1938 de-
clined to issue a permit for the public showing 
thereof, whereupon an appeal prosecuted under the law the 
Circuit Court of the City of Richmond, after· viewing the 
picture and hearing testimony for and against, reversed the 
Board and.ordered the issuance o.f the permit. 
The Court determined, as is shown in a written opinion, 
that the law, Code Section 378-d, required the Division Board 
to issue a perriiit 'unless the film was found "obscene, inde-
cent, immoral, inhuman, or is of such a character that its ex-
hibition would tend to corrupt morals or incite to crime.'· 
The similarity of the quoted language to the Lynchburg City 
Ordinance will be noted. 
That court said : 
'' Obscene is defined: 
1. Offensive to decency or to chastity of mind; immodest; 
indecent; shameless; indelicate; impure; filthy, causing lewti 
thoughts. · 
Indecent is defined: 
Unbecoming; unfit for the eyes or ears; not decent; in-
delicate; immodest; improper; as an 'indecent exposure of 
the person; indecent conversation.'' · · 
Immoral is defined: 
Contrary to morality; not moral; vicious; wicked; unjust; 
dishonest. · 
Upon a consid.eration of this provision of the law cover-
ing motion pictures it is not necessary for me to consider 
whether the picture embodies features that are 'im-
page 25 ~ moral, in411man,. or such that would tend to cor-
rupt morals or incite to crime,' because a view of 
the picture demonstr.ates beyond the peradventure of a. 
doubt that there i~ nothing· which would incite sP-x. The onlv 
question for consideration is whether the picture is obscene 
or indecent. 
Since the presentation of this picture ii::; advocated, as 
shown by their testimony i.n eonrt, by ministe1·s, ~ocial ser~~. 
ice workers, nurses, doctors, those interested in public, wel-
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fare, there can be no question of any lack of responsible con-
sideration for the public which was indica ive of t~eir be-
lief that the picture was a sincere and nee ssary cQniribu-
tion to public. welfare produced without stent~tion and 
without desire to present a -spectacle to t e public. It· is 
my opinion that motion pictures shown e ry day on the 
screen would have a far greater tendency to ffect the mo.rals 
of youth and adults than would '' The Birth f a Baby.'' 
In the last analysis it is the mental an spiritual view 
which the observer takes in viewing this pict re. If his mind 
tends toward obscenity or indecency, he m y see in it that 
which he expects or intends to see, but if his nd is not so bent 
he will see something in it that is educatioial and wonder-
ful. As has been so rightly said by a phq. sopher that an 
educated man is onP. who can look into a mu· puddle and see 
something beside mud. If a spectator of this icture wants to 
get something· that is mentally unwholesome he may be able 
to find it, but if he Wants to look on somet ·ng . that is a 
miracle and see himself as a product of th t miracle, then 
the presentation of "The Birth of a Baby" s entirely justi-
fied. I am, the ref ore, of the opi : on that the ac-
page 26 ~ tion of the Division of Motion Pici me Censorship 
Board should be reversed and the r c.ense granted.'' 
So much of the opinion of the learned J clge of the Cir-
cuit Court of the City of Richmond is here- q 1otecl to demon-
strate that in court, pursuant to a law of the State, the same 
identical question was presented for order r, judicial de--
termination as is now by the defendants s ught to be re-
examined and passed upon against the Co plainant, under 
the alleged authority of a city ordinance. 
The decisive issue in this case is, Can tlhis be lawfully 
done? 
It must be conceded that as to the same subject matter 
State authority comprehends and supersedes local authority, 
even as the greater includes the less, unless it appears that 
the sovereig·n state by proper enactment ha shown a pur-
pose and intention otherwise. 
One acquitted under a statute may not be .onvicted under 
an ordinance pP.nalizing the aUe-ged same i entical offense. 
It will hardly be contended that one holdi g a permit un-
der the Moving Picture Censorship Act won d be subject to 
conviction, under the state statute ( Code Section 4549) 
penalizing the exhibition of immoral or obsc e pictures, for 
showing- the thus permitted picture. 
In what right then may one who may not e convicted un-
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der the statute be liable to conviction under the ordinance 
penalizing the same subject matter Y 
To st;1.stain the ordinanee the City sets up Sections 38, 26, 
and 35 of its Charter, abstracts from which are 
page,-27 } given above. 
If it be conceded that the ordinance is valid as 
against exhibitors not holding permits from the State Cen-
sorship Division, such concession would not reach the issue 
here. 
"It is a general principle that when legislation covers the 
entire field previous provision~ of either the common or 
statutory law in conflict therewith become no longer opera-
tive.'' 
Comrnonwealth v. Connnissioner of Bank.<;, 240 Mass. 244, 
13B N. E. 625-8. . 
The reenactment of the cited ,Charter powers in 1938 does 
not operate to authorize· the adoption by the City of ordi-
nances effootive to supersede or repeal the provisions of the 
Motion Picture Censorship Act adopted in 1930, nor to vali-
da~e Auch an ordinance previously adopted. 
Geor,qe v. Asheville (C. -C. A.), 8 Fed. (2nd), 50; 103 A. L. 
:f:t. 568. 
Said Charter section 38 grants the Council '' all police 
powers ... * ~· except such as may be specially d~nied cities by 
A-ct of the General Assembly," but the Moving Picture Cen-
sorship Act, rig·htly construed to remove such censorship 
from the local to the state field, operates as a special denial 
of like authority to municipalities. 
Likewise Charter sections twenty-sixth and thirty-fifth are 
not to be construed as authorizing the ·adoption of an ordi-
nancA in conflict with a statute upon the same subject. The 
City may not thus denounce as immoral and obscene and un-
clean the same picture that the State, the superior 
page 28 ~ authority, has found moral and clean. The c01dict 
is appar,mt in the result. 
64 A. L. R... 984. 
State v. C.itrran., 1l N. E. (2nd), 245, 4H C. ~T., page 2Ht 
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Scott v. Lichford, 164 Va. 419, cited for th defendants, ap-
pears to have ruled that a later general act f the Assembly 
did not repeal by implication a special prov,ision of the City 
0harter. Here the question is did the reena~'tment of a char-
ter provision serve to authorize or validate 1the adoption of 
an ordinance that would operatP. in conflict '!"th a previously 
enacted general statute upon the same subj ct matter. 
To hold that the ordinance does not appl in the present 
case i8 not to invalidate the ordinance. • 
If a moving picture deemed immoral by th City should be 
exhibited in the City without a permit fro the State Cen-
sorship Division, the exhibitor would appear to be subject to 
prosecution under the ordinance as a valid ercise: of char-
ter power. 
The City contends that section 378-h of :he Code in the 
Censorship Act, providing that '' The divi ion shall have 
authority to P.nforce the provisions and purp ses of this act; 
but this shall not be considered to relieve a y state or local 
peace officer from the duty otherwise imposed f detecting and 
prosecuting· violations of the laws of the Sta e of Virginia,'' 
is Avidence of Legislative intention not to epeal City or-
dinances such as the one under considerati n here. So be 
it in ~o far as the ordinances would not op rate in conflict 
with the act. ·· 
Also it may well be that the proviso a~ai ·st the relieving 
. peace officers, coupled with the f orcement au-
pag·e 2B ~ thority granted the division, is to ake clear that 
the latter is not exclusive. 
To promote detection by agents of the Di ision, peace oi 
ficers and the public generally, of unautho ized films, the 
act requires that evidence of grant or per ·t must appear 
and be shown as a part of the film when exhi ited. 
The instances cited of other authorized · spection ordi-
1mnces paralleling State inspection statutes re distinguish-
able in reason. 
It is well possible that opportunities to scape state in-
spection, to make alterations or substitution. after such in-
spection. possible deterioration. and differin:-. local condition 
and situat.iom; might supply valid reasons f r local inspee-
tion laws as to motor fuels, foods, -and fire scapes that do 
not obtain as to moving pictures. 
It would be an anomalous rule that would c ntemplate find-
ing- the Rame picture moral and clean in one ocality and im-
moral and unclean in another. 
Moreover the evidences of legislative int ntion that the 
Movie Censorship Act shall have exclusive a statewide ap-. 
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plication · appearing in and in connection with that act are 
not evident as to the cited iuspectiop provisions in regard to 
other subjects. 
In Shaw v. Norfolk, 167 Va. 346, cited for the defendants, 
the Court quotes with approval from McQuillin,-
"The true doctrine appears to be that, whether the city 
may exercise control of sta_te offenses must be determined 
l,y the legislative intent. ...L\..ncl such intent must also decide 
the manner in which th(_) power is to be exercised, 
page 30 ~ and whether such control is to be exclusive or 
whether it is to be. exercised concurrently with that 
of the stab~.'' 
The title of the latest (1930) ena~tment of the Act in is-
sue is illuminative of the legislative intent: '' An Act pro-
viding for thP. regulation of mo_tion and sound films, reels 
or records ns<?d in conm~ction with any motion picture; pro-
viding a system of examination, approval and regulation 
thereof and of all matters connected _therewith", etc~ · 
A:pplyinp; '' the true doctrine,'' quoted above, to the pre~--
ent case, and bearing in mind that after all, rnlPs of construc-
tion are desig·ned for the ascertainment of legislative intent 
and give way when that intent is manifest, it appears clear 
here from the title of the acts, the comprehensive language 
used. the evils to be remedied and thP. system chosen that 
it was intended to establish a uniform method of admeasure-
ment of films in the respects indicated _to apply throughout 
th~ State, and which when applied and met would in the 
judgment of the Le~h,latu:re both bP.st Rafe~nard the people 
of the State ap;ainst the exhibition of improper films aud· 
insure against prosecution the owners · of thP. films who are 
taxP.d to pay for the inspections thu"s required and made.· 
To these ends the statute is comprehensively framed. A 
competent Board is provided for. All films proposed to be 
exhibited publicly anywhere in the State are required to be 
first submitted, for inspection, to be viewed, and reviewed 
if neCP.ssa.ry, by the Board. . 
If. a permit is declined, appeal may be taken, as was had 
for the film now in issue, to thP. Circuit Court of the iOity 
of Richmond, the trial court most generally 
page 31 ~ charged by law with the determination of issues 
affecting State officers and of stntewide import 
in that connection. That high court of record is lclven au-
thority, after hearing evidence and argument. to review and 
reverse, as we have sPen was done as to this film, the decision 
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of. the Board, and· to require the issuance bv the Division of 
the permit sought. _. .. 
It does not appP.ar reasonable that after aving thus pro. 
vid&d for a decision by a high court of recortl it was in con-
templation that that decision mig·ht in effec·t'e made subject 
to review and reversal by any Justice of t)l Peace or Trial 
M:~gistrate under a City ordinance. This :rµi ht result if the 
contention of the defendants be sustained in he instant case. 
'11hereby at least some of the apparent prilme purposes of 
thP. Act would be brought to nought. I 
Tho State by its statute having occupied tb'.e entire field of 
moving picture censorship, municipalities Jre thereby ex-
cluded therHfrom as to matters comprehende by the statute. 
Geor_Qe v. A slzr.ville ( 0. 0. A.), 8 Fed. (2n ) 50, 103 A. L. 
R. 568, and· authoritiP.s cited. 
Similar State movie censorship statutes tave for some 
years been in effect in various States. Muni ipal ordinances 
reg·ulating· moviHs are not uncommon. Yet c unsel have not 
cited nor has an extP.nsive search found any ecision of any 
. court anywhere holding that under like circu¥1stances a con-
viction eould be SUStainPd Under a municipal r:dinance. 
Having· concluded that the ordinance vouch'-d is insufficient 
to support the position taken by the City in this case, it be-
comes unnecessary to consider further the poter of the City 
authorities under that ordinance. 
page 32 ~ It follows from what has been sa ,d that the com-
plainant may have a decree stri n~ out the an-
swer of the defendants and declaring the com lainant 's right 
to exhibit the film ''Birth of a Baby'' as agai st any conten-
tion made in the rAcord here. 
It being assumed that public authorities ·u not act con-
trary to this judicial declaration of right, t e present issu-
ance of the injunction prayed for is not d emed required 
but the complainant if RO advised may have le ve reserved to 
renew hereafter its aµplication for an inju ction if found 
necessary. 
AUBREY E. STR 
page 33 ~ And now at this day, to-wit, at ynchburg Cor-
poration Conrt, February 14th, 19·3 , the date first 
hereinbefore mentioned. 
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This cause came on this day to be heard upon the bill of 
complainant filed by leave of Court J.anuary 21, 1939, duly 
sworn to, and the exhibit filed therewith, praying for an in-
.junction against the City of Lynchburg and R. W. B. Hart, 
City Mana.ger, the respondents named therein; upon the no-· 
tice of the complainant, Dominion Theatres, Incorporated~ 
likc,wise filed on said date by lea.ve of Court, notifying the 
said respondents that on said date, to-wit, January 21, 1939, 
the said complainant would move this Court for an injunc-
tion against the named. respondents and the police officers, 
officials, agents and servapts of the said City enjoining and 
restraining them, upon the grounds stated therein, from in-
t(:\rfering with the proper exhibition by said complainant of 
a motion picture entitled "The Birth of a Baby", service of 
which notice was acknowledged on behalf of said respond-
ents by T. G. Hobbs, their attorney, January 18,.1939; upon 
the joint answer of said respond~nts, City of Lynchburg and 
R. W. B. Hart, City Manager, likewise filed tT anuary 21, 
1939, by leave of Court; and upon thP. motion of the com-
plainant, likewise filed by leave of Court on said date, .to 
strike out the afore said joint answer of respondents to the 
complainant's bill upon the grounds therein set forth; and 
was argued by counsel. 
Upon consideration whereof, and the Court being· of opinion 
for reasons stated in a written memorandum of _opinion filed 
and hereby made a part of the record, tha.t the Division of 
. Motion Picture Censorship, duly c.reated and es_. 
page 34 ~ tablished under the laws of the State of Virginia, 
has examined the motion picture entitled, '' The 
Birth of a Baby'', and has issued a valid permit for the ex-
hibition thereof, as shown by a certified copy of said permit 
filed aH Exhibit "A" with the bill. and that under and by 
virtue of said permit the complainant is authorized and per-
mittetl under the laws of the State of Virginia in such cases 
made and provided to exhibit the same in the State of Vir-
·p:inia, and that the -City of Lynchburg is without right under 
the police powers granted to it by the State of Virginia, either 
by general law or by any of the, provisions of the charter of 
said City. to prohibit the exhibition of the motion picture 
film aforesaid within the City of Lynchburg, doth sustain 
the motion of the complainant to strike out the joint answer 
of said respondents, and doth Adjudge, Order and Decree that 
the respondents' joint answer be and the same is hereby 
sh ickcn out; to which action of the Court the respondents 
excepted. 
And the respondents declining to make further or amended 
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answer to the complainant's bill, the Court d th further ad-
judge, order and decree that the same be a d it is hereby 
taken for confessed; and the Court being furt er of the opin-
ion that an actual controversv has arisen be Teen the com-
plainant and the respondents~ aforesaid with respect to the 
rigM of the respondent City of Lynchburg toirohibit or for-
bid thJ exhibition of the motion picture afore aid, which has 
been duly licensed or approved by the Division of Motion Pic-
ture Censorship of the State of Virginia, an the Court has 
jurisdiction to determine said controversy, an~1:l to adjudicate 
and declare said right under the Act of the -eneral Assem-
bly of Virginia approved March 8; ·1922, Virginia 
page 35 ~ Code Section 6140(a), doth adjudge,, order and de-
cree that the complainant has the I right to make 
proper exhibition of said motion picture film ·thin the City 
of Lynchburg·; to which action of the Court t e respondents 
excepted. 
And the Court being of opinion that it is n t necessary or 
proper that it in this case pass upon the uestion of the 
authority of the City of Lynchburg to prohibi or forbid the 
showing by complainant of any motion pictur for which the 
Division of Motion Picture Censorship may ave granted a 
permit other than ''The Birth of a Baby" doh so hold, and 
doth decline to pass upon such question; to hich action of 
the Court the complainant excepted. 
And the Court being further of opinion tha an injunction 
i!o;; not neces~mry at this time to protect the rig ts of the com-
plainant, doth decline to grant an injunction j8S prayed for, 
but leave iR granted to the complainant, in ca~e it should be 
necP.ssary in the future for the protection of its rights, tq 
renew its application to this Court for an injunttion; to which 
action of the Court in refusing to grant the inj mction prayed 
for the complainant excepted. 
And the respondents, the City of Lynchbur and R. W. B. 
Hart. ifa Oity Manager, have indicated to the ourt their in-
tention to appeal to the Suprcm(l Court o.f peals of Vir-
g·inia from the ruling of this Court, the Com doth further 
adjudge, order and decree tha.t the operation of this decree 
be suspended for a period of thirty days from he date of the 
entry of this order; to which action of the ourt the com-: 
plainant excepted. 
page 36 ~ I, Hubert H. Martin, clerk of tte corporation 
court for the city of Lvnchburg·, do ertify that the 
foreg-oing iR a true transcript of the record i the cause of 
;poµiinion Theatres, Inc. 'l'. City of Lynchburt, an<l R. vV. B. 
38 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
Hart, •City J\fan3:g·er there'Of, and I further certify that no-
tice as required by': Section ~339 of the Code of Virginia, has 
been duly given, as appears by a paper writing filed with 
tha record in said cause. 
· The clerk's fee fof:this· transcript is $15.00. 
Given under my haud thi~ 16th day of Feb 'y, 1'989. 
HUBERT H. MARTIN, Clerk . 
... I\. Copy-Teste : 
M. B. WATTS, 0. C. 
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